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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Coral Harbor Rehabilitation and Nursing Center (the 
“Center”) asks us to review the National Labor Relations 
Board’s determination that the Center violated Sections 8(a)(5) 
and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by (1) refusing to 
bargain with 1199 Service Employees International Union 
United Healthcare Workers East (the “Union”) as the 
representative of the Center’s licensed practical nurses 
(“LPNs”) and (2) unilaterally changing their wages and 
benefits without notice to the Union or providing the Union an 
opportunity to bargain.1  Because the Board’s decision is 
consistent with precedent and supported by substantial 
evidence, we will deny the Center’s petition for review and 
grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. 
 
                                                                




The Center purchased a nursing home in which the 
Union represented two separate units of employees – a unit of 
LPNs and a unit of service employees that included certified 
nursing assistants (“CNAs”).2  After the purchase, the Center 
hired a majority of the LPNs who had worked for the former 
employer, increased their wages, and changed their paid leave 
and health benefits, without making any effort to bargain the 
changes with the Union.  Approximately 25 LPNs and 36 
CNAs were ultimately employed by the Center.   
 
After the Center changed the terms of the LPNs’ 
employment, the Union filed charges of unfair labor practices, 
alleging that the Center had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) 
of the NLRA by refusing to bargain with the Union as the 
representative of the LPNs, and by later making unilateral 
changes to their wages and benefits without notice to the Union 
or providing the Union an opportunity to bargain.   
 
After an initial investigation, the Board’s General 
Counsel filed a complaint of unfair labor practices against the 
Center.  The Center responded that it was a Burns successor 
and therefore not under any obligation to recognize or bargain 
with the Union over the changes in the terms of the LPNs’ 
employment because the LPNs had been converted into 
supervisors and were therefore exempt from the protections of 
the NLRA. 
 
Thereafter, an administrative law judge conducted an 
evidentiary hearing at which four of the Center’s LPNs, its 
Director of Nursing (“DON”), and its Administer testified 
about the activities and responsibilities of the LPNs.  
According to that testimony, the LPNs did not attend morning 
staff meetings with managers but did receive completed master 
schedules and could add or subtract CNAs on the schedule with 
permission from the DON.  The LPNs were told that they 
                                                                
2 LPNs at the Center distribute medication, provide 
treatments, and ensure that the needs of residents are met.  
CNAs provide basic care to residents and assist with daily 
living functions, such as feeding, grooming, dressing, 
walking, hygiene, and bathing.   
4 
would play an active role in supervising CNAs, would have the 
authority to exercise their independent judgment, were 
expected to discipline employees, and complete employee 
evaluations. 
 
A section of the employee handbook entitled “Role of 
Licensed Professional Nurses (LPNs) and Registered Nurses 
(RNs)” stated: “RN and LPN Supervisors . . . have the 
responsibility to issue discipline (oral and written warnings) to 
nursing assistants when they believe warranted. Discipline can 
be for matters relating to resident care or for violations of the 
employee rules of conduct under Coral Harbor’s Progressive 
Disciplinary System.”3 A Notice of Disciplinary Action 
(“disciplinary notice”) is a form containing a narrative about 
an employee’s infraction and the type of discipline issued, i.e., 
verbal warning or write-up. 
 
Testimony offered by the LPNs at the hearing regarding 
specific instances of imposing discipline can be summarized as 
follows: LPN 1 testified that she has not personally disciplined 
anyone, but that she has signed and delivered disciplinary 
notices for two employees that were completed by the DON.  
The DON filled out the disciplinary notices and gave them to 
her to issue.  In fact, according to LPN 1, she was not present 
when either employee committed their respective infractions.  
 
LPN 2 testified that she twice imposed discipline 
against the same CNA—a verbal warning and a written 
discipline for re-education.  However, like LPN 1, LPN 2 did 
not witness the infraction and did not have access to the 
personnel file of the CNA to know what “level” of discipline 
to administer.  She was, however, instructed by the 
Administrator and DON on how to proceed in terms of 
discipline.  The severity and ultimate approval of the discipline 
was left to the discretion of the DON.     
 
LPN 3 testified that she would first have to get the 
disciplinary notice from the DON and consult with the DON 
                                                                
3 JA-1224. 
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or a supervisor4 before disciplining anyone.  When she wrote 
the narrative on the disciplinary notice for an employee, the 
verbal warning and approval of the discipline was determined 
by the DON.  LPN 3 further testified that on two separate 
occasions she was asked to deliver a disciplinary notice to a 
CNA, but the notice itself had been filled out by a supervisor.  
On each of those occasions, her only role was the physical 
delivery of the notice.   
 
Lastly, LPN 4 testified that she issued three disciplinary 
notices, without instruction or consultation and made formal 
recommendations, but the subsequent discipline was handled 
by the unit manager.  However, LPN 4 also testified that for 
three other disciplinary notices she was simply asked for her 
signature on a notice that was already completed, or she was 
instructed to write up the notice for an infraction she had not 
observed.  
 
The DON testified that if an LPN completed a 
disciplinary notice for a CNA, she (the DON) would 
investigate and review the personnel file, which the LPN did 
not have access to, and then determine the appropriate severity 
of the discipline.  The DON confirmed that she or the staffing 
coordinator determined CNA schedules.  An LPN could not 
perform independent scheduling or direct employees in their 
assignment—only the DON could.  The LPNs testified that 
they were not involved in training of the CNAs; again, that was 
the responsibility of the DON. 
 
Based on the testimony, the ALJ found that the Center 
was a Burns successor and that it had hired a majority of its 
predecessor’s employees.   The ALJ thus concluded that the 
Center had an obligation to bargain with the union of its 
predecessor.  The ALJ also found that the LPNs were not 
supervisors as defined by Section 2(11) of the NLRA but were 
instead, statutory employees protected by the NLRA and 
represented by the Union.  Accordingly, the ALJ held that the 
Center violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA by 
refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union, 
                                                                
4 LPN 3’s use of the term “supervisor” during her testimony 
referred to either a unit manager or the assistant DON 
(“ADON”), but never an LPN. 
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and by making unilateral changes to the wages and benefits of 
the LPNs without notice to the Union or giving it an 
opportunity to bargain over the changes.     
 
The Center filed exceptions with the Board but limited 
its challenge to the ALJ’s findings regarding the LPNs’ role in 
discipline and adjusting grievances.  The Board affirmed the 
ALJ’s rulings and findings.  The Board specifically concluded 
that the Center failed to establish that the LPNs (1) have 
supervisory authority to discipline or effectively recommended 
discipline or (2) possess the supervisory authority to adjust 
grievances.   
 
Thereafter, the Center petitioned us to review the 
Board’s decision, and the Board cross-petitioned for 
enforcement of its order.5 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
  
Our “review of orders of the Board is highly deferential.”6  
“We accept the Board’s factual findings if they are supported 
by substantial evidence . . . [and] exercise plenary review over 
questions of law and the Board’s application of legal 
precepts.”7  Substantial evidence “means relevant evidence 
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”8  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. NLRB v. Burns  
 
In NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc.,9 the Supreme 
                                                                
5 The Board possessed jurisdiction over the unfair-labor-
practice proceeding under Section 10(a) of the NLRA. 29 
U.S.C. § 160(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
10(e) and (f) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f). 
6 Trimm Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 351 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 
2003).   
7 Spectacor Mgmt. Grp. v. NLRB, 320 F.3d 385, 390 (3d Cir. 
2003); see Adv. Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 
592, 606 (3d Cir. 2016). 
8 NLRB v. ImageFIRST Unif. Rental Serv., Inc., 910 F.3d 725, 
732 (3d Cir. 2018). 
9 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
7 
Court held that a successor employer is ordinarily free to set 
initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a 
predecessor.  It is therefore undisputed that as a successor-
employer, the Center had the right to set the initial terms of 
employment for LPNs when it took over operations for the 
nursing home.  Accordingly, “[a] new employer has a duty 
under §8(a)(5) [of the NLRA] to bargain with the incumbent 
union that represented the predecessor’s employees when there 
is a ‘substantial continuity’ between the predecessor and 
successor enterprises.”10  As the Court explained in Burns: 
Although a successor employer is ordinarily free 
to set initial terms on which it will hire the 
employees of a predecessor, there will be 
instances in which it is perfectly clear that the 
new employer plans to retain all of the 
employees in the unit and in which it will be 
appropriate to have him initially consult with the 
employees’ bargaining representative before he 
fixes terms.11 
Thus, under Burns, “the new employer, succeeding to the 
business of another, had an obligation to bargain with the union 
representing the predecessor’s employees.”12 
 
Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees “the right 
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”13   
Section 8(a)(1) states: “[i]t shall be an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of” their Section 7 rights.14  
Section 8(a)(5) states: “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for 
                                                                
10 Chester ex rel. NLRB v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 
87, 100 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing 
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43 (1987)). 
11 Burns, 406 U.S. at 294–95. 
12 Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 29 (citing Burns, 406 U.S. at 
278–79).  
13 29 U.S.C. § 157.   
14 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).   
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an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of [its] employees.”15   
 
However, not all employees are included under the 
protective umbrella of the NLRA and collective bargaining.  
Employers are not required to afford collective bargaining 
rights to supervisory employees.16  The Center concedes that it 
refused to bargain with the Union on behalf of the LPNs and 
that it unilaterally changed the LPNs’ wages and benefits 
without notice to the Union and without providing the Union 
an opportunity to bargain.  Therefore, resolution of this dispute 
turns on whether the LPNs were statutory supervisors under 
Section 2(11) of the NLRA.   
B. NLRB v. Kentucky River 
 
“To be entitled to the [NLRA’s] protections and 
includable in a bargaining unit, one must be an ‘employee’ as 
defined by the [NLRA].”17 The NLRA states that the term 
“employee” includes: 
any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless this 
subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall 
include any individual whose work has ceased as 
a consequence of, or in connection with, any 
current labor dispute or because of any unfair 
labor practice, and who has not obtained any 
other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment, but shall not include any 
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, 
or in the domestic service of any family or person 
at his home, or any individual employed by his 
parent or spouse, or any individual having the 
status of an independent contractor, or any 
individual employed as a supervisor, or any 
individual employed by an employer subject to 
the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to 
time, or by any other person who is not an 
                                                                
15 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).   
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
17 Mars Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); NLRB v. Kentucky River 
Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001)). 
9 
employer as herein defined.18 
Thus, the NLRA excludes supervisors from the definition of 
“employee.”  “Supervisor” is defined as:  
any individual having authority, in the interest of 
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, 
recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or 
discipline other employees, or responsibly to 
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in 
connection with the foregoing the exercise of 
such authority is not of a merely routine or 
clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment.19 
 
Supervisors are not protected under the NLRA provisions that 
protect employees, and supervisors are not included in a 
bargaining unit.20   
 
“Whether someone is a supervisor is a question of fact, 
and thus will be upheld if . . . supported by substantial 
evidence.”21  In Kentucky River, the Supreme Court decided 
“which party in an unfair-labor-practice proceeding bears the 
burden of proving or disproving an employee’s supervisory 
status; and whether judgment is not ‘independent judgment’ to 
the extent that it is informed by professional or technical 
training or experience.”22  The Court acknowledged that the 
NLRA does not “expressly allocate the burden of proving or 
disproving a challenged employee’s supervisory status.”23  The 
Board “has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that 
the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is 
a supervisor.”24   
 
As the party claiming supervisory status, the Center 
                                                                
18 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphasis added). 
19 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 
20 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
21 Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 853. 
22 532 U.S. at 708. 
23 Id. at 710. 
24 Id. at 710–11. 
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bears the burden of establishing it here.25  Whether an 
individual is a statutory supervisor is a question of fact 
particularly suited to the Board’s expertise and therefore 
subject to limited judicial review.26  We must uphold the 
Board’s supervisory-status conclusion as long as it is supported 
by substantial evidence, “even if we would have made a 
contrary determination had the matter been before us de 
novo.”27 
 
In Kentucky River, the Court established the following 
three-part test for determining whether an individual is a 
supervisor: 
Employees are statutory supervisors if (1) they 
hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 
listed supervisory functions [in Section 2(11)], 
(2) their exercise of such authority is not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the 
use of independent judgment, and (3) their 
authority is held in the interest of the employer.28 
The Center alleges that the LPNs were supervisors under the 
NLRA because they had authority to discipline or effectively 
recommend discipline of CNAs.  We disagree. 
 
It is clear under Kentucky River that our inquiry here 
must focus on whether the LPNs have “use of independent 
judgment” to impose discipline.29  A person exercises 
independent judgment if she “act[s], or effectively 
recommend[s] action, free of the control of others and form[s] 
an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data.”30  
Judgment is not independent if it is “dictated or controlled by 
detailed instructions, whether set forth in company policies or 
rules, the verbal instructions of a higher authority, or in the 
                                                                
25 Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 854. 
26 Id. at 853. 
27 Citizens Publ’g & Printing Co. v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 224, 232 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
28 532 U.S. at 713 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
29 Id.  
30 In re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 693 
(2006). 
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provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.”31  Moreover, 
in order for judgment to be independent, it “must involve a 
degree of discretion that rises above the ‘routine or clerical.’”32  
This standard seeks to distinguish “between straw bosses, 
leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees,” 
who are included within the NLRA’s protections, “and the 
supervisor vested with such genuine management prerogatives 
as” those established under Section 2(11).33 
 
This record supports the Board’s conclusion that the 
Center’s LPNs lacked independent judgment as required under 
Section 2(11).  The Board agreed with the ALJ’s findings that 
“[a]ll discipline must be cleared with the DON or manager and 
the DON or manager must approve all recommendations of 
discipline of employees.”34  While the four LPNs who testified 
stated that they issued disciplinary notices to CNAs, they all 
also testified that they did not fill out the level or type of 
discipline on the disciplinary notices.  Instead, that section of 
the notice was left open to be “signed off” and imposed by the 
DON.   
 
Moreover, the LPNs did not have access to employee 
personnel files and therefore could not know what level of 
discipline was appropriate in any given case.  Rather, it was the 
DON who filled out disciplinary notices herself or received 
notices from an LPN, investigated the matter, talked to the 
CNA, and determined the appropriate level of discipline.  
Accordingly, it can hardly be said that the LPNs were 
responsible for administering discipline to the extent required 
for supervisory status under the NLRA.  
 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether there are established 
policies that control whether a verbal warning will be issued 
for a given infraction as opposed to a written one or whether 
there is some form of incremental discipline.  “Under its 
written disciplinary policy, [the Center] retains discretion to 
                                                                
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 
267, 280–81 (1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 4 (1947).  
34 JA-22. 
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impose whatever level of discipline it determines is 
appropriate, and the disciplinary notices in the record do not 
follow any defined progression.”35  However, it is clear that 
LPNs cannot exercise independent discretion to decide the 
level of discipline that will be imposed. 
 
The Board agreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that: (1) 
LPNs do not have the authority to assign or the responsibility 
to direct CNAs with use of independent judgment; (2) LPNs 
do not have authority to discipline CNAs and others; (3) the 
evaluations of CNAs are not determinative of LPN supervisory 
status; and (4) LPNs do not have accountability nor authority 
to responsibly direct.36 
C. NLRB v. Vista Nursing 
 
The Center further argues that under our decision in 
NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, the NLRA 
does not preclude an LPN from having supervisory authority 
merely because her recommendation is subject to a superior’s 
investigation.37  In New Vista, we identified two considerations 
which do not negate supervisory status: “(1) whether a nurse’s 
supervisor undertakes an independent investigation; and (2) 
whether the employees exercise their supervisory authority 
only a few times (or even just one time).”38  We also recognized 
that three factors – considered in the aggregate – may establish 
that an individual is a statutory supervisor: “(1) the [individual] 
has the discretion to take different actions, including verbally 
counseling the misbehaving employee or taking more formal 
action; (2) the [individual’s] actions ‘initiate’ the disciplinary 
process; and (3) the [individual’s] action functions like 
discipline because it increases severity of the consequences of 
                                                                
35 Coral Harbor Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. & 1199 SEIU United 
Healthcare Workers E., 366 NLRB No. 75, *1 n.6 (May 2, 
2008). 
36 Under the third prong of our Kentucky River inquiry we 
determine whether the authority of the alleged supervisors is 
held in the interest of the employer; however, since we 
conclude that the Board correctly ruled that the Center’s 
LPNs are not statutory supervisors under prongs one or two, 
we need not reach prong three. See 532 U.S. at 713. 
37 870 F.3d 113, 132–33 (3d Cir. 2017). 
38 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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a future rule violation.”39  
 
Here, after the Board decided that the ALJ’s conclusion 
was consistent with Kentucky River, it specifically cited to our 
decision in New Vista, explaining that “the same result would 
obtain under the standards employed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit [in New Vista 
Nursing].”40  We agree. 
 
Notwithstanding the Center’s reliance on New Vista, it 
is clear that the LPNs here lacked discretion to impose 
discipline.  The Board found, “[i]n every instance where an 
LPN-witness was questioned about a specific disciplinary 
notice, the witness testified, without contradiction, that a 
manager had instructed the LPN to fill out and sign the 
disciplinary notice, had actually filled out the disciplinary 
notice and simply instructed the LPN to sign it, or had brought 
a CNA’s infraction to the LPN’s attention and suggested that a 
disciplinary notice was warranted.”41  It is clear that the 
Center’s LPNs do not have “discretion to take different 
actions,”42 unless instructed by a manager.  
  
The Center has failed to carry its burden and did not 
establish that the LPNs “initiate a progressive disciplinary 
process”43 or that such a process even exists.  Nowhere in the 
Center’s brief does it offer an explanation of how any of its 
disciplinary actions follow a progressive disciplinary policy 
“and the disciplinary notices in the record do not follow any 
defined progression.”44  And because the LPNs lacked access 
to CNA personnel files, they could not determine appropriate 
levels of discipline.  The LPNs’ inability to determine which 
level of discipline was appropriate demonstrates that there was 
a clear lack of “supervisor” training for LPNs and their actions 
did not “initiate a progressive disciplinary process.”45 
  
                                                                
39 Id. at 132. 
40 366 NLRB at *1 n.6. 
41 Id. 
42 New Vista, 870 F.3d at 132. 
43 Id. at 136. 
44 Coral Harbor, 366 NLRB at *1 n.6. 
45 New Vista, 870 F.3d at 132. 
14 
Lastly, the Center has not established that an LPN’s 
involvement with disciplinary notices “increases severity of 
the consequences of a future rule violation.”46  As we have 
explained, unit managers, the ADON, or the DON impose the 
level of discipline they deem to be appropriate at any given 
time.  There is also evidence of individual CNAs receiving the 
same level of discipline for multiple infractions.  Nowhere 
does the record establish that a subsequent infraction increased 
the severity of discipline after an LPN was involved in issuing 




For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 
substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that 
the LPNs were not statutory supervisors and they were 
therefore not excluded from the NLRA’s protections.  
Accordingly, the Center had an obligation to inform the Union 
of the changes it made in the LPNs’ duties and to refrain from 
making those changes in the absence of bargaining with the 
Union.  We will therefore deny the Center’s petition for review 
and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. 
                                                                
46 Id. at 136. 
